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A growing body of empirical studies have been interpreted as 
support  for  a  laissez-faire  policy  towards  mergers.  These 
"event  studies"  examine  the reaction of  stock market  prices  of 
firms that announce an agreement to merge.  The type  ~f reaction 
reveals  whether  a  merger  is  motivated  by  a  desire  for  market 
power  or purely to  improve market efficiency. 
In this paper,  a  version of the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM)  is applied to determine if abnormal returns are earned by 
rivals of  22  pairs of  firms  whose  attempted horizontal  mergers 
were  challenged  by  the  federal  anti  trust  agencies.  At  most 
eight,  and  possibly  only  five,  of  the  cases  were  found  to  be 
motivated by  efficiency in seeking merger,  and at most six,  and 
possibly only one,  were motivated by market power;  the rest were 
inconclusive. 
The event-study technique is highly flawed  for the study of 
business-regulation effects.  Numerous unrealistic assumptions, 
inappropriate data constraints, and questionable interpretations 
hamper .the application of this technique to policy analysis. Introduction 
Since  the  beginning  of  the  1980s,  empirical  studies  using 
stock  market  data  have  been  used  to  undermine  the  basis  of 
traditional horizontal merger policy.  Traditional policy holds 
that when  horizontal mergers  cause  sales concentration to rise 
beyond some critical level,  the tendency of sellers to engage in 
collusive behavior increases.  There is a  presumption that some 
mergers are motivated by  a  desire to enhance market power.  This 
group  of  "revisionist"  studies  tends' to  support  a  broad  effi-
ciency rationale  for  horizontal  mergers.  Two  frequently  cited 
"revisionist"  studies  are  by  S:tillman  (1983)  and  Eckbo  (1983). 
Both studies used the returns to horizontal rivals in challenged 
mergers  as  a  criterion to  determine if these  merg~rs supported 
the  market  power  hypothesis  or  if the  rival  returns  supported 
the efficiency hypothesis.  Such  studies are often called event 
studies. 
This hypothesis was tested using the Market Model  (MM)  which 
analyzes the adjusted stock prices of firms  involved in horizon-
tal mergers  with their rivals'  stock price  on  certain critical 
dates  (namely,  announcement  of the merger  and  announcement of  a 
challenge  by  antitrust  agencies).  Under  the  market  power 
(collusion)  hypothesis,  the expectation is for abnormal positive 
returns  for  rivals  on  dates  of  high  probability  of  merger 
(announcement)  but  abnormal  negative  returns  on  dates  of  low 
probability  of  merger  (challenge).  Abnormal  positive ·returns 
for  rivals at the  merger  announcement  are  expected  because  if 
the  merger  is  expected  to  result  in  successful  collusion  the 
benefits will be gained by rivals inside the collusive scheme as 2 
well  as  free-rider  rivals.  Abnormal  negative  returns  at  the 
time  a  challenge becomes  known  in the market  because the poten-
tial gains  of  the collusive  scheme  are  lost.  Abnormal  returns 
are those significantly different from the returns of comparable 
firms unaffected by the announcement.  Stillman and  Eckbo  found 
slight  positive  abnormal  returns  for  rivals  on  announcement 
dates  but  no  significant  abnormal  returns  for  rivals  on  the 
challenge dates of interest.  Thus,  the market power  (collusion) 
hypothesis  was  not  fully  supported,  and  the  authors  concluded 
that the mergers  supported the efficiency hypothesis. 
One  set  of  criticisms  of  such  studies  is  methodological. 
Some  researchers doubt the validity of any  econometric analyses 
in the area of horizontal merger policy  (Fisher and Lande  1983) . 
Others find fault with the underlying assumptions  of the model. 
The  MM  assumes  no  change  in  systematic  risk,  assumes  only  one 
merger is occurring in the industry,  and takes little account of 
the business cycle as an explanatory factor in merger motivation 
(Conn  1985). 
stillman and  Eckbo  are  open  to additional .criticisms,  both 
as to methods  and  interpretation.  The first statistical criti-
cism concerns the sample size of both stUdies.  Stillman's data, 
based  on  the  mergers  challenged within  the  eight years  between 
1964  and  1972,  may  not  represent  a  large  enough  sample.  Eckbo 
had a  larger sample size of mergers but he did not test for sig-
nificant abnormal  returns of the target and bidder firms  on  the 
event  dates,  and  thus  may  have  included  extraneous  mergers  in 
his  sample. " 
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A second criticism involves rival selection.  stillman used 
the  internal  "fact  memoranda"  of  the  antitrust  agencies 
(obtained  by  the  Freedom  of  Information Act),  which  identified 
rivals the  enforcement  agencies  felt would  be  affected.  Eckbo 
used the Standard Industrial Classification  (SIC)  codes to iden-
tify rivals.  The  SIC  code  method  may  bias  the  study  because 
these rivals may  become candidates for "defensive" mergers them-
selves.  If the rival has the potential to be  a  target or bidder 
in  a  merger,  the reaction to the  enforcement action may  not  be 
entirely  due  to  the  market  power  or  efficiency  hypothesis  for 
horizontal rival reaction. 
A third criticism involves the  length of the event period. 
By  using the one-day residual,  the abnormal return on the event 
day,  stillman  assumes  that  all  relevant  information  regarding 
the  merger  is available  to  the  capital  market  in  a  very  short 
time.  Eckbo  uses  the  cumulative  average  abnormal  return  (CAR) 
technique which allows  a  longer period to be examined.  However, 
this  technique  assumes  that  the  probability  of  the  merger  is 
equal over the entire  "window"  period  (the days  surrounding the 
merger which  is used to obtain the residuals for the determina-
tion of  abnormal  returns). 
The  final  criticism  involves  evaluating  all  rivals  as 
equals.  Economic theory suggests different effects of horizon-
tal merger for rivals of different size.  Merger rivals may  also 
be stratified on the basis of the percentage of the firm's  out-
put in the affected industry.  For  example,  if the portfolio of 
rivals contain  a  large conglomerate  which  obtains  only  a  small 4 
portion of  its business  from  the merger-affected  industry,  the 
effects may  be different than for  a  firm whose  entire output is 
in the merger-affected industry. 
There are also criticisms pertaining to the authors'  inter-
pretations.  The logic in using evidence from challenged mergers 
to  pronounce  antitrust  policy  inefficient  is  suspect.  Chal-
lenged mergers are inherently "borderline cases".  What has been 
neglected in the analysis is the effectiveness of deterrence in 
preventing anti-competitive mergers . . Obviously anti-competitive 
mergers  are  often  not  attempted  because  the  transaction  costs 
for  firms  are  too  high  when  a  merger  will  not  withstand  the 
scrutiny  of  the  anti  trust  enforcement  agencies  is  abandoned 
(Werden  and  Williams  1986).  The  mergers  in  the  stillman  and 
Eckbo  studies  all  occurred  prior  to  the  implementation  of  the 
1982/1984  Department of Justice Merger Guidelines.  It is  ques~ 
tionable whether  the results  can  have  implications  for  present 
policy. 
Both  studies  refute  the  market  power  hypothesis  for  the 
basis  of  horizontal  merger  and  do  not  reject  the  efficiency 
hypothesis.  However,  that  does  not  mean  that  the  efficiency 
hypothesis should be accepted.  The authors do not give adequate 
reasons  for  accepting  the  efficiency  hypothesis  and  did  not 
distinguish  between  economies  of  scale  and  other  rationales 
(Halpern  1983). 5 
Objective 
The overall objective of this study is to examine the empir-
ical validity of  event studies that have  sought to  explain the 
market  impacts  of horizontal merger  enforcement  at the  federal 
level. 
This  study will  examine  the sensitivity of  the results  of 
such studies to time period,  number  of rival firms  selected for 
analysis,  statistical  technique  and  the  assumption  that  rival 
firms can be treated homogeneously.  Horizontal merger data will 
be  examined  up  to  the  middle  of  1980s,  so  as  to  enlarge  the 
sample  and  provide  further  insight.  The  technique  of  rival 
selection will  be  in  concordance  with  that  of  stillman,  i.e., 
rivals are  identified  by  antitrust enforcement  agencies,  where 
available.  The  supplement  rivals  identified  by  FOIA  requests, 
industry  analysts,  members  of  academia,  gove+nment  agency 
analysts  and  the  merging  firms  were  contacted  to  target  the 
horizontal merger rivals.  For the  sake of  comparison,  both the 
statistical  techniques  of  the  one-day  residual  and  the 
Cumulative  Abnormal  Return  (CAR)  will  be  employed.  Horizontal 
rivals will  be  stratified by  percent  shipments  in the  relevant 
SIC  code  to  determine  if  the  effects  of  horizontal  merger 
enforcement differ in this respect. 
Oligopoly Theory 
The  Structure-Conduct-Performance  (S-C-P)  Paradigm  posits 
that  market  structure  influences  firm  conduct  and  hence  firm 
performance.  Part  of  the  controversy  surrounding  horizontal 6 
merger  policy  may  be  traced  to  criticisms  of  the  theoretical 
underpinning  of the S-C-P  paradigm. 
The historical starting point in formal  oligopoly theory is 
August  Cournot.  In  his  theory,  established  firms  assume  the 
output  of  their major  rivals  is  fixed  and  set prices  in  their 
share of the market as monopolists.  This theory concludes that 
a  market  composed  o·f  a  small  number  of  non-colluding 
oligopolists will  have  a  higher  equilibrium price  than  when  a 
larger number  of  firms  exist. 
More  recent  theories  include  the  dominant  firm  model  and 
various  collusive  pricing  models.  The  dominant  firm  model 
predicts  price  setting  by  the  large  firm(s)  and  price-taking 
followership  by  the  small  competitive  fringe  firms.  In  the 
event of  a  merger  involving the acquisition of  a  fringe firm  by 
the  dominant  firm  by  the  demand  for  dominant  firm's  product 
becomes  less elastic in the short run.  This less elastic demand 
allows for a ·decreased profit-maximizing output,  and thus fringe 
firms  can "free-ride"  on  higher  industry prices  (Stigler 1965). 
Chamberlin's  "small-numbers"  oligopoly pricing model  views  the 
market  as  being  characterized  by  "mutual  interdependence". 
Assuming  entry is blocked,  when  the  number  of rivals  is small, 
the  firms  may  recognize that  a  change  in their price or output 
causes  price  or  quantity  changes  by  their rivals,  and,  hence, 
their own  profits.  Instead of acting independently  (as  in pure 
competition)  the firms  find it best to plan their actions based 
upon the anticipated responses of rivals, i.e., strategic behav-
ior.  One  strategy that produces rents for all firms is tacit or 7 
explicit collusion -- a  cartel.  Further,  the  effectiveness  of 
this  cartel  increases  as  the  number  of  firms  decrease  because 
there is an increased probability of detecting cheaters  (Stigler 
1964). 
In addition to collusion,  another form of oligopoly conduct 
is predation.  The  threat  of  predatory  conduct  by  established 
firms  post-entry is  a  barrier to entry.  Predatory  behavior  is 
characterized by the oligopolistic firm overproducing output or 
over-purchasing  inputs.  The  intent  of  this  behavior  is  to 
disadvantage  rival  firms  by  reducing  market  price  or  imposing 
unsustainable higher costs.  Pr,edation is not an outcome that is 
discussed at great  length  in the event-study  literature.  This 
lack  of  attention  may  stem  from  the  inconclusive  effects  on 
rivals.  If it is accepted that price-wars  or  cost-escalations 
are  not  a  necessary  condition  for  predation,  then  there  is  no 
observable phenomenon for event studies to measure.  Also,  there 
is  a  body  of  theoretical  opinion  that  predatory  pricing  is 
innately irrational  (Scherer  and  Ross  1990). 
Legally,  market power is defined as the ability of a  firm(s) 
to  raise  prices  above  the  competitive  level  without  suffering 
below-normal profits or the ability to raise barriers to entry. 
Economically, ' market  power , is  defined  as  the  ability  to  set 
price  above  marginal  cost  or  the  ability  to  follow  strategies 
that reduce the profitability of entry by at least some would-be 
entrants.  Market  power  is  important  because  legislation  pro-
hibits mergers which  "may substantially less'en competition", the 8 
legal terminology  for  a  small  chance  of  a  significant  increase 
in market  power. 
The  evolution  of  U. S.  case  law  revealed  violations  of 
section  7  of  the  Clayton  Act,  until  the  early  1980s,  by  the 
following  structural conditions: 
1.  the  merger  would  result  in  a  "large"  combined  market 
share of the newly  merged  company; 
2 .  the  merger  would  lead  to  a  sUbstantial  increase  in 
industry  concentration  (Allen  (1981)  found  the  CR4 1 
must  exceed  40%  of the relevant market); 
3.  the  merger  must  be  indicative  of  a  "massive  trend" 
towards  fewer  independent firms  in the relevant market, 
i.e.,  incipiency. 
The  prohibition of horizontal mergers  sterns  from  potential 
welfare losses generated by the market power of anticompetitlve 
mergers.  Welfare  losses  may  stern  from  the  production  of  the 
wrong  set  of  goods  and  services,  an  inadequacy  in  output,  or 
from  technical  inefficiencies.  The  annual  dollar  value  of 
losses  related  to  horizontal  mergers  the  U. s.  economy  have 
estimates  as  low  as  0.01%  of  GNP  and  as  high  as  0.06%  of  GNP 
(Pautler 1983). 
In horizontal merger policy,  the question is whether or not 
the  merger  may  yield  market  power.  The  methods  used  by  anti-
trust agencies have  changed  over time  and are  now  at their most 
CR4  is the concentration ratio,  or the combined  market  share, 
for the four  largest firms  in the  industry. 9 
"sophisticated and quantitative" with the implementation of the 
Department  of  Justice  1984  Merger  Guidelines.  Looser  industry 
concentration standards  for  challenging mergers  implied  by  the 
guidelines,  an~ a  tendency  to  broader  product  and  geographic 
market  boundaries  resulted  in  far  fewer  challenged  mergers  in 
the 1980s.  The antitrust agencies also permitted merging  firms 
to  drop  one  or 
merger.  This 
cha,llenges. 
a  few  product  lines  as  a  prior  condition  of 
"fix-it-first"  policy  also  reduced  merger 
Motivation for Merger 
The  underlying  assumptions  of  the  workings  of  mergers  are 
hotly  debated.  Some  of  the  theories  for  merger  are:  market 
power,  corporate control,  and financial  "value maximization"  (a 
version  of  the efficiency school  of  mergers).  As  noted  above, 
stillman and Eckbo  number  among the proponents of the efficiency 
hypothesis.  Mergers  are  viewed  as  an  efficient alternative to 
bankruptcy," a  protective device  for  small  shareholders,  and" as 
a  means of greater management efficiency and thus better alloca-
tion of resources  (Manne  1965).  One  justification proposed for 
the  efficiency  hypothesis  is  due  Schumpeter.  In  this  view, 
monopoly  power  and its attendant profits are a  necessary condi-
tion for technical advances,  while perfectly competitive markets 
hinder  these  advances.  If progress  is  defined  as  innovation, 
there  is  no  consensus  in the  current  literature verifying this 
view.  The  empirical  relationships  between  firm  size, 10 
concentration  and  technological  innovation  are  in  dispute 
(Williamson  1968,  Brozen  1982,  Kamien  and  Schwartz  1982). 
The  financial-value-maximization  school  argues  that  high 
stock  prices  for  some  firms  are  the  result  of  good  management 
decisions,  luck,  reputation,  innovativeness,  and  the  like. 
other  efficiency-type  rationales  for  merger  are  seen  in  the 
financial realm and are termed  "value maximization motivation". 
One  such theory is the financial motivation of merger  as  a  tool 
for  the  "redeployment  of  excess  cash"  held  by  the  target  or 
bidder  firm.  This  "synergy"  argument  for  mergers  rests  on  the 
expectation that cash flows will be greater than that of the two 
original  firms.  These  greater  cash  flows  may  be  predicted  on 
expected economies of scale or excess capacity in the factors" of 
production.  Examples of these factors are managerial and finan-
cial control.  " 
A  final  financial  goal  of  merger  is an  attempt  to  capture 
the  benefits  from  asymmetric  information  in  the  market.  This 
asymmetry  may  be  a  disparity  in  the  market  value  of  a  target 
firm or information held by the bidder,  which "if deployed by the 
target  would  increase  the  market  price  of  the  targets'  stock. 
Examples  of  this  type  of  information  include  technological  or 
other operating strategies. 
Therefore,  high  profits  do  not  result  so  much  from 
"artificial  scarcity"  or  collusion  but  as  from  "superior 
entrepreneurship" .  A  provocative  and  often  quoted  line  of 
reasoning  suggests  that it is  "natural  frictions  and  ignorance 
that  characterize  any  real  economy",  not  barrier~  to  entry, 11 
which yields market power  (Demsetz  1973).  It follows  from  this 
argument that antitrust enforcement policy that penalizes large 
efficient  firms  may  lead  to  problems  by  decreasing  innovative 
success and result in welfare  losses to society.  This  view has 
been  instrumental in attempts to relax antitrust policy towards 
horizontal mergers. 
An  alternative  theory  argues  that  mergers  occur  out  of  a 
desire  by  managers  for  corporate  control.  This  desire  for 
corporate control  is seen  as  conceptually distinct  from  econo-
mies  of  scale,  innovativeness,  market  power,  or  other  profit-
driven  motives.  Managerial  utility  related  to  sheer  company 
size is the driving force,  irrespective of its impact  on  stock-
holder wealth. 
A  related managerial  motivation  for  an  acquisition  may  be 
the defensive strategy of avoiding a  takeover or what  Greer has 
called  "buying  so  as  not  to  be  bought"  (Greer  1986).  The 
reasons underlying this defensive strategy may  be to accumulate 
an  unpalatable  debt  or  become  sufficiently  large  to  deter  a 
merger-hungry acquiring firm.  The act of acquisition may thwart 
the  takeover  attempt  when  the  bidder  has  already  obtained  a 
portion  of  stock  and  an  acquisition  on  the  part  of  the target 
"dilutes"  the  stock.  The  other  reasons  for  defensive  acquisi-
tions  are  strategic  position,  regulated  buys  and  reciprocal 
reaction.  If . an  industry  is  experiencing  extensive  merger 
activity,  a  firm  may  deem  aggressive  acquisition  necessary  to 
cover its flanks.  The  regulated buy  is a special case  in which 
the  acquisition  of  a  particular  company  by  the  target  would 12 
deter the bidder because of regulatory entanglements.  Recipro-
cal  reaction  is  the  "Pac-Man"  defense  in  which  the  hunter 
becomes  the hunted. 
The  Empirical  Model 
Economic  theory  posits  that if  a  merger  is  efficient,  it 
will  generate  an  increase  in  societal  welfare  and  represent  a 
Pareto-efficient  change  (stillman  1980).  By  contrast,  if  a 
merger  reduces competition,  the allocation of resources will be 
less  than  optimal.  Stillman  defines  an  inefficient  merger  as 
one  in  which  the  sum  of  consumer  and  producer  surplus  is  less 
than that surplus if the merger  had  not occurred. 
This  suggested welfare measurement  is not  feasible  because 
it is difficult to determine  when  to  begin measuring  the price 
effects;  there  is  also  the  problem  of  anticompetitive  effects 
occurring  outside  the  realm  of  price  parameters.  Empirical 
studies using stock return data and the event-study methodology 
have  become  more  numerous  due  to  wider  access  to  computerized 
stock  data  tapes,  dissatisfaction  with  the  use  of  accounting 
data,  the acceptance  of  the efficiency of  capital markets,  and 
the  acceptance  of  the  cumulative  abnormal  return  (CAR)  as  a 
normative  index.  The  CAR  can  be  interpreted as  an  indicator of 
short-term  changes  in  market-adjusted  stock  prices  and  an  ex 
ante valuation for  the  long-run effects of the merger.  ~ 13 
Assumptions  of the Market Model 
The  event-study methodology  employs  several  assumptions: 
1.  the capital market  is efficient, 
2.  the capital market reacts to all new  information, 
3.  stock returns have mUltivariate  normal  distribution, 
4.  risk is stationary,  and 
5.  no other mergers are occurring that involve the ·firm or 
industry of  interest at the  same  time. 
These  assumptions  are  open  to  a  number . of  criticisms, 
especiallY when  using daily stock price data  in  an  econometric 
analysis.  Daily  data  have  been  ·found  to  exhibit  leptokurtic 
distributions  when  compared  to  monthly  n~rmal  distributions  ~ 
These  "fat-tailed"  distributions  have  a  greqter  number  of 
observations  in  the  tails  and  thinner  peaks.  This  effect  is 
mitigated  when  the  abnormal  returns  are  averaged  cross-
sectionally  but  the  firm-specific  abnormal  ~eturn may  exhibit 
cross-sectional dependence.  For  a  more  thorough  examination of 
these  issues,  see  Brown  and  Warner  (1985).  A  second  problem, 
that  of  non-synchronous  trading,  occurs  when  the  firm's  stock 
and  the  market  portfolio  or  market  index  are  measured  over 
different trading intervals.  Non-synchronous trading can cause 
the  abnormal  returns to display serial dependence. 
The assumption of stationarity of risk,  or beta stationarity 
has. come  under review  in recent analyses of  even~ studies  (Conn 
1985, · Halpern  1983).  Economists  at  the  FTC,  using  data  from 
Stillman  (1983),  found  that  the  systematic  risk  for  rivals 
decreases after events which increase the probability of merger. 14 
This may reflect a  less risky market environment for rivals.  It 
was also found that systematic risk increases. after events which 
decrease  the  probability  of  merger  (Kupiec  and  Mathios  1986). 
This  change  in  risk  may  be  associated  with  the  tendency  for 
mergers  to  occur  in  periods  of  economic  expansion  when  stock 
prices are  likely to rise and  interest rates to fall.  In this 
case the beta or systematic' risk parameter  may  change. 
Aside  from  the  controversy  about  the  assumptions  of  the 
Market Models,  it is readily accepted that stock price movements 
provide  a  means  of analysis of merger effects.  If an  event has 
implications  for the value  of  a  stock it ought  to  be  reflected 
in the stock's price as  soon as it,is anticipated by one or more 
market  participants.  The  Market  Model  is  a  specific  model  of 
equilibrium expected returns,  a  "valid benchmark",  which  may  be 
used  to  measure  abnormal  changes  associated  wi  til  regulatory 
changes.2  Fama,  et  ale  are  credited  with  devising  the  "event 
time analysis" of abnormal performance.  Abnormal performance is 
the  deviation  from  the  realized  return  of  the  firm  and  the 
expected  risk-adjusted  return.  The  Market  Model  implies  that 
with efficient capital markets,  the stock returns to firms that 
are  rivals  of  the  merging  firms  will  be  linearly  related  to 
overall  market  returns.  Thus  the  relationship  between  rival 
2  The  major difference between the  CAPM  and  the Market  Model  is 
that the  intercept term  in the  CAPM  is the risk-free rate of 
return  minimum  variance  zero-beta portfolio which  may  change 
over time while the  MM  intercept term is constant over time. 15 
returns  and  overall  market  returns  can  be  estimated  via  an 
ordinary Least Squares  (OLS)  regressor. 
The concept of event-time involves analyzing all firms  in a  ' 
particular  sample  that  have  been  affected  by  a  regulatory 
announcement  or  other  piece  of  information  likely  to  affect 
future  profits.  As  part  of  this  concept,  analysis  is  inde-
pendent  of  calendar  time,  depending  only  on  the  event,  regard-
less of when  the event occurred.  The  abnormal  returns of these 
firms  should not  be  correlated and  the variance  of  the  average 
abnormal  returns should be' proportional to the  sum  of the indi-
vidual abnormal  returns  (Schwert  1981).  This  absence of corre-
lation  is  useful  when  combining  firms  from  unrelated  mergers 
into  a  large single portfolio. 
Specific Procedures 
In order to examine mergers  likely to have affected rivals, 
a  filter would  be  performed which  required either the bidder or 
the target firm to exhibit a  statistically significant abnormal 
return on  both event dates. 
The  steps  involved  in  implementing the Market  Model  are  as 
follows: 
1.  The first step is to estimate the stock's characteristic 
line (i.e., the linear relationship between the returns 
of merger participants and overall market stock returns) 
with Ordinary Least Squares to obtain the intercept  (a) 
and  slope  (8)  coefficients for  a  period up  to,  but not 
including,  the  event  window.  The  event  window  is  a 
period of  days  surrounding the merger  event date which 16 
is  judged  to  capture  the  effects  of  the  event  on  the 
price of the stock.  The  characteristic line is 
(1)  E(Ij  lIm}  = cX j  + BjImti 
where: 
r ·  J  = the  stock  market 
participant, 
return  for  the  merger · 
r mt  = the market factor,  an equally weighted portfolio 
of  firms,  which  captures  the  affect  of  market-
wide  shocks,  and 
E  = the expectations operator. 
Equation  (1)  estimates  the  conditional  expected  value 
of the merger participants stock return. 
2.  Calculate  the  difference,  or  residual,  between  the 
expected  return  based  on  the  conditional  response,  as 
in (i),  and the actual return of the stock during a  ten-
day  window  period surrounding the event 
where: 
~t  = the residual. 
3.  Sum  the  residuals  to  obtain  the  cumulative  abnormal 
return  (CAR)  for  the ten-day window  period: 
m 
(3)  €j + 10  =  L €j  t  I 
t=n 
where: 
n  = the first day  in the window,  and 
m = the last day  in the window. 17 
4.  To counteract the problem of response to other informa-
tion  and  insure  that  the  abnormal  returns  are  due  to 
merger  events,  the  sample  of  N  stocks  which  have  a 
merger  announcement  and challenge are  examined  and  the 
accumulated response relative to day  0,  the event day, 
is computed  as  an  average  of the residuals: 
_  1  N 
E t  = - L  €jt· 
N  j-1 
(4) 
5 .  The final step is to compare actual stock returns on the 
event date to the average computed in  (4) .  If there is 
a  statistically  significant  difference  between  these 
values,  it  can  be  concluded  that  abnormal  returns 
occurred.  The presence of abnormal returns for merging 
firms  provides  the  basis  for  analyzing  rival  returns. 
This  analysis  follows  stillman  who  relegates  the 
industry-shock term to the disturbance term. 
6.  In the initial assessment of the bidder and target firms 
returns  to  determine  further  investigation,  steps  (1) 
through  (3)  were completed.  A t-test is then calculated 
to  test  the  null  hypothesis,  that  is  the residual  is 
zero  (H: €jt=O) .  The  null hypothesis  may  be  interpreted 
that the merger had no significant impact on the returns 
to the bidder or target firms. 
7.  After  determination  of  which  mergers  were  significant 
by  the  above  analysis,  the returns to rival firms  were 
analyzed  to  test  for.  indications  of  anticompeti ti  ve 
effects of the mergers.  The  equations used to analyze 18 
the response of horizontal rivals of challenged mergers 
were  provided by  Brown  and Warner  (1985).3  A procedure 
similar  to  the  above  is  performed  to  analyze  rival 
returns at the merger  announcement  and  challenge.  The 
residuals calculated in this step are used to test for 
anticompetitive  and  efficiency  effects  of  horizontal 
mergers. 
In  calculating  the  test  statistic,  a  series  of 
windows  of  fixed  sizes are shifted during the observa-
tion period.  In this study the  length of the observa-
tion  period  is  allowed  to  vary  with  the  size  of  the 
window. 4  For  each  day  in  the  observation  period  an 
average  and  a  variance  of  the  cumulated  errors 
(residuals)  for  all  rivals  in  the  portfolio  is 
calculated and the overall results are combined to yield 
the t-statistic. 
8.  In this analysis,  two  sets of regressions are obtained 
for  the  challenge  date.  The  first set of  OLS  regres-
sions  re-estimated.  The  second  set of  OLS  regression 
deletes the .observations falling within the announcement 
window  in  the  estimation  period  establishing  normal 
3  Please  note  the  differences  in  equations  are  corrections  of 
typographical  errors  in  the  original  article.  The  goal  of 
these equations is the  same  as the previous equations  in this 
chapter but are calculated differently. 
4  For example,  the  31 -day  window has  an estimation period of  75 
days;  when the window size is decreased to 21  days the estima-
tion period  increased to  a  length of  85  days. 19 
expected 'returns for the challenge date.  The equations 
are or the residuals were  obtained as 
A  A 
( 5 )  Aj t  = Ri  t  - ex i-iS  i ~t  I 
where: 
~t  = the daily return of the rival's stock, 
~t  = the equally-weighted market portfolio, 
~t  = the  residual  or difference  between  the  expected 
...  ... 
and  actual  return,  and  elj  and  Bj  are  the  OLS 
market  model  parameters  for  each  firm. 
Equation  (5)  corresponds to equations  (1)  and  (2) . 
It  gives  a  residual  for  each  day  in  the  estimation 
period,  to  be  used  in  computing  the  variance,  and  a 
residual or  abnormal  return for  each  day  in the window 
period.  For  exqmple,  the  31-day window  has  an  estima-
tion  period  of  75  days;  when  the  window  size  is 
decreased to 21  days the estimation period increased to 
a  length of  85  days. 
9.  Then,  the  average  deviation  (A)  across  the  firms  for 
each day  (~),  is computed  as 
(6) 
with  corresponding variance, 
(7) 
1 
wk  + 95 - 1 
where 
(8) 20 
for  each  window  of  length  wk  days.  The  window  lengths 
used in the examination of rival portfolios were 31,  21, 
11,  3,  and  1.  These window  lengths were used in Eckbo-
weir  (1985).  The  use of windows  of varying length stem 
from  the  uncertainty  about  the  time  the  information 
presented by  the event is imputed  in the market.  If a 
window is too short,  there is the risk of losing infor-
mation  about  the  effects  of  the  announcement. 
Conversely,  if  the  window  is  too  long,  there  is  the 
possibility that the  information  on  the  effect  of  the 
event will be diluted by  looking at superfluous data. 
10.  The  final  step  is to  compute  the  overall t-statistic, 
T,  according to the  following  expression 
(9)  T  -
Testing for the Market  Power  Hypothesis 
This  hypothesis  posits  that  a  merger  may  signal  the 
increased probability of an effective collusive scheme with both 
the  merged  firm  and  its  horizontal  rivals  obtaining  monopoly 
(monopsony)  rents.  The  horizontal  rivals  will  obtain  these 
rents whether  they are participants  in the  collusive  scheme  or 
free-rider  beneficiaries.  The  stream  of  future  rents  is 
capitalized into the firm's stock value.  Thus,  assuming that an 
effective collusive scheme did not exist among these firms prior 
to  the  merger,  at  the  time  the  merger  becomes  known  in  the 21 
capital  market,  the  rivals  should  exhibit  positive  abnormal 
returns.  Assuming there is some chance it will be blocked,  they 
will  experience  negative  abnormal  returns  at  the  time  a 
challenge by  the antitrust enforcement  agency  becomes  known. 
However,  consider  the  possibility  of  predatory  behavior. 
The  post merger  firm might  be  expected to  become  a  more  effec-
tive predator because of increased size and diversification.  As 
mentioned  above,  this  scenario  is  not  seriously  considered  by 
the revisionists.  They reason  that if the predator  is willing 
to take  the short-run losses  incurred  when  driving  out rivals, 
the assets will  go  to other  firms  entering the  market  (Scherer 
1990).  The differences turn on entry conditions.  Predation may 
be  entirely  possible  if  high  sunk  costs  in  either  plants  or 
brand  names  make  new  entry  into the market  less rewarding.  If 
predation is feasible,  then abnormal positive returns will go to 
the  merged  firm,  while  negative  returns  to  rivals  at 
announcement. 
Testing for  the  Efficiency Hypothesis 
The  efficiency  hypothesis  rests  on  the  assumption  of  a 
'competi ti  vely  structured  industry  in  which  the  merger  takes 
place.  Those  adhering  to the efficiency hypothesis  argue that 
there  are  two  types  of  efficient  mergers.  The  productively 
efficient merger  puts  downward  pressure  on  product  prices  and 
upward  pressure  on  factor  prices.  As  a  result,  horizontal 
rivals are  expected to obtain  negative  abnormal  returns  at the 
time of the merger announcement and positive abnormal returns at 
.the time  of the challenge -- the  same  result as  for predation. 22 
The  other efficiency hypothesis  is information efficiency. 
There  are  two  possible  scenarios.  First,  if  the  efficiency 
information  the  merger  reveals  is  in  an  area  of  technological 
advance  that  cannot  exclude  the  rivals,  and  the  technological 
advances  are  not  dependent  on  an  act  of  merger  for  the  rival 
firms to take advantage of this information,  then the pattern of 
rival returns  and  positive at the time  of the  announcement  and 
zero at the time of the challenge.  This pattern of signs is the 
same  as  the  scenario of  the merger  occurring  because  resources 
held by  the target  (and rivals)  are under-valued  and the merger· 
signals  this  information  to  the  market.  Second,  if  the 
efficient information involves an area of technological advance 
that  necessitates  the  completion  of  a  merger  by  rival  firms, 
then the pattern of rival returns are  non-negative at the  time 
of  the  announcement  and  non-positive  at  the  time  of  the 
challenge. 
Combined  Effects 
Eckbo  (1983)  suggests  that  the  collusion  and  efficiency 
hypotheses  are  not  mutually  exclusive.  The  changes  in  the 
r ivaI's  returns  can  represent  the  sum  of ·  the  simultaneous 
effects  of  efficiency  and  collusion.  He  adds,  "In  principle, 
efficiency gains can outweigh collusive gains",  so that positive 
abnormal  returns  at  the  time  of  announcement  and  negative 
abnormal  returns at challenge is a  necessary but not sufficient 
condition for  accepting the collusion hypothesis. 23 
Summary  of Effects 
The  competing  hypotheses  concerning  the  effects  of 
challenged horizontal mergers are briefly summarized in Table 1. 
Table  1.  Expected  Signs  of Returns  for Rival  Firms 
as  a  Result of Horizontal Merger,  Three 





Challenge  I 
1- Market  Power: 
a.  Collusion  + 
b.  Predation  + 
2.  Economic  Efficiency: 
a.  Productivity  + 
b.  Information  +/0  0 
3 •  Combined  Effects 
Collusion/Efficiency  +/- -/+ 
The goal of this research is to re-examine whether previous 
empirical  findings  on  horizontal  mergers  challenged  under 
Section  7  of  the  Clayton  Act  are  valid  by  examining  the 
sensitivity  of  results  to  changes  in  sampling  or  .testing 
procedures.  stillman  (1983)  found that upon  examining the one-
day  residuals  of  18  merger  events  involving  11  challenged 
horizontal  mergers,  only  2  of  these  events  exhibit  abnormal 
returns  consistent  with  market  power  hypothesis  (l.a.  in 
Table 1).  Eckbo  (1983)  found  that  rival  portfolios  on 
announcement had an average of +2.45%  abnormal return,  which was 
three standard deviations from zero.  Rival portfolios earned on 
challenge  +1.78%  above  normal  returns,  which  was  only  one 24 
standard deviation from  zero.  Both of these returns relied upon 
a  31-day  window.  Thus,  this  study  found  that,  on  average, 
economic  efficiency due  to  information  (2.b.)  was  the rule. 
Eckbo-wier's  (1985)  subsequent  article  found  similar 
results.  Rivals  earned  significant  positive  returns  on 
announcement  and  positive  but  less  significant  returns  on 
challenge.  This  result  was  consistent  for  periods  before  and 
after the passage of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act  and  for  both  SIC 
and  agency-based rival portfolios.) 
Sample  of Horizontal Mergers 
The  challenged  mergers  and  rivals  for  the  stillman  study 
were provided by his unpublished dissertation.  Eckbo's disser-
tation provided challenged mergers to 1978.  A lengthier list of 
challenged  horizontal  mergers  through  1980  was  developed  for 
Eckbo  and  Wier  (1985).5  The  sample  of  challenged  horizontal 
mergers  was  extended  from  1980  to  1985  by  the first author. 
The  mergers  in  this  study  carne  from  the  Trade  Regulation 
Reporter  (Department  of  Justice  cases)  and  the  Federal  Trade 
Commission's  FTC  Decisions.  Because the Center for Research  in 
Security Prices  (CRSP)  daily stock returns data begin on July 2, 
1962,  only mergers announced after this date are under consider-
ati,on.  The  first  task  in  the  data  selection  process  was  to 
5  The rivals in the Eckbo-Wier  study were  obtained from Michael 
Williams,  a  Department of Justice staff economist.  The DOJ  had 
replicated  the  Eckbo-Wier  study  published  in  1985,  and  had 
obtained the rivals  from  Eckbo. 25 
select  challenged  section  7  horizontal  mergers  in  cases  where 
the  compla.int  stemmed  from  damage  to  actual  competition,  not 
potential competition nor incipiency.  However,  according to the 
Werden-Williams  stuay,  some  of  the  challenged  mergers  in  the 
Eckbo-Wier  study  did  not  conform  to  this  criterion.  The 
stillman  study  excluded  the  horizontal  mergers  of  industries 
which  were  "heavily regulated",  such  as  banking or airlines. 
The  challenge  date  was  provided  by  the  same  publication 
which  listed the merger.  All the authors stated that they used 
the Wall  street Journal to find the announcement date.  If that 
method was unavailable for the additional 1980-1985 observations 
we  developed,  we  used  the  date  of  the  completion  of  the 
acquisition. 
For this study,  a  stringent filter was  employed  in order to 
ensure  that the  events  in  each  merger  were  truly  significant. 
The  merger  was  dropped  from  the  sample  if both  the  bidder  and 
the target· were  not  listed on  the  CRSP  tape.  Regressions  were 
performed  on  the  firms  using  a  31-day  and  a  3-day  window 
surrounding the  merger  announcement  and  challenge.  The. merger 
remained  in the sample if there was  a  statistically significant 
abnormal return at a  90%  confidence level for either firm in the 
window  surrounding both  event dates.6 
6  stillman used a  similar filter without requiring both firms to 
be  on  the  tape  py  demonstrating  investors'  reaction  to  the 
merger  events  for  one  of  the  merging  firms  and  used  the 
collusion  hypothesis  t9  test  whether  the  firm's  abnormal 
return was  consistent with the hypothesis  on that event date. 26 
Following  this method  a  final  sample  of  22  mergers  remain 
(see Appendix table).  Of the 22  mergers,  16 mergers had signif-
icant abnormal returns for either or both firms  on the announce-
ment  and  challenge  dates  using  a  3- and  31-day  window.  The 
remaining  five  firms  had  significant abnormal  returns  for  both 
event  dates  for  the  target  firm  while  the  bidder  firm  did  not 
have  abnormal  returns. 
Selection of Horizontal Merger  Rivals 
A rival portfolio was  obtained  for all the mergers  with at 
least  one  significant  t-statistic  for  bot~ event  dates.  The 
rivals  for the mergers  in the stillman study were  published  in 
both the 1983 article and his dissertation.  The stillman rivals 
were  all  firms  which  were  specified  in  agency  publications  or 
documents  obtained  via  the  Freedom  of  Information  Act  (FOIA). 
The  rivals  in  the  larger  Eckbo-Wier  (1985)  sample  were  kindly 
provided by  researchers at the u.s.  Department of Justice.  The 
rivals  for  the  Eckbo-Wier  study  consisted  of  both  SIC  code 
rivals  and  agency  rivals.  For  the  portion  of  later  mergers 
(1980-1985)  in the  study,  the  sample  of  rivals was  obtained  by 
examining  court  dockets  and  through  FOIA  requests  from  the 
antitrust  agencies.  When  possible,  for  each  merger, 
research~rs,  industry  experts,  government  analysts,  and  the 
merged  firms  themselves were contacted and  aided in the identi-
fication of rival firms.  This resulted in a  small yet accurate 
rival portfolio,  possibly more  accurate  than  previous  studies. 
In some  cases the affected rival firms  were  not included in ·the 
rival  portfolio  because  these  firms  were  not  listed  on  either 27 
the  New  York  or  American  stock  Exchanges.  As  an  example,  Dr. 
Jim  MacDonald  of  the  Economic  Research  Service  of u.s.  Depart-
ment  of  Agriculture  was  contacted  regarding  rivals  on  the 
ConAgra  and  Peavey merger.  The  major rivals of interest in the 
flour milling industry were Cargill,  Bunge,  and Hubbard Milling. 
All  are privately and  hence  unavailable  for  examination.  Some 
additional  mergers  which  a  major  relevant  rivals  that  were 
privately  owned  or  foreign  owned  were  Great  Lakes  Chemical  and 
Northwest  Industries for  which the rival was  Dead  Sea  Chemical, 
an Israeli firm. 
Every effort was  made to assure  a  relevant rival portfolio. 
Geographic  boundaries  of  the  relevant  market  were  taken  into 
consideration.  Eckbo's rivals were pared down when necessary in 
order to  conform  to this criterion.  For  example,  the Atlantic 
Richfield/Sinclair merger  had  a  geographic  market  boundary  for 
branded  gasoline  in  the  "Northeast,  Rocky  Mountain,  Southeast 
and  Central  State markets".  Eckbo-Wier  found  31  rivals,  con-
sisting of  5  ag·ency  and  25  SIC  rivals.  After  checking to  make 
sure  the  rivals  were  in  the  relevant  geographic  and  product 
market  there remained  16  rivals  in the  branded  gasoline market 
in these regions.7 
Traditionally,  horizontal merger rivals are obtained by  one 
of  two methods.  stillman used the agency rival method  in which 
Freedom of Information Act requests .are made to the agency which 
7  Two  of  the  rivals,.  Union  Oil  of  California,  now  Unocal,  and 
Tetra  Tech  could  not  be  extracted  form  the  CRSP  tape  leaving 
14  rivals  in the portfolio. 28 
challenged the merger.  The  alternate method  uses  the  Standard 
Industrial Classification  (SIC)  code  for  a  company's  principle 
business,  which  is  available  on  the  CRSP  tape.  The  inherent 
difficulty in the  second  method  involves  the  general nature  of 
the four-digit level SIC  code available on the CRSP 'tape and the 
specific and  narrow nature of the merger-affected market. 
As an example of this difficulty, consider the Allied-Signal 
companies  merger.  The  affected market  for  this merger  was  air 
turbine starters used for  large commercial aircraft,  which is a 
small  part  of  the  ignition/starter  systems  market.  Not  all 
firms  that  make  aircraft  starter  systems  make  air  turbines. 
Another  SIC  code  problem  is  illustrated  by  the  White 
Consolidated-White M~tor merger.  Eckbo used the SIC code of the 
target firm  as  the relevant market.  White  Motor's  SIC  code  is 
3711  yet the relevant market  was  SIC  3523,  which  is heavy  farm 
equipment.  As  a  result  the  entire  rival  portfolio  was 
incorrect. 
So  in ' summary,  there  can  be  several  problems  in  using  the 
SIC  code  method  in selecting rival firms.  The  relevant market 
can  be  quite  narrow  so  that the  SIC  code  on  the  tape  does  not 
assure that every firm targeted actually produces in that narrow 
market.  This  is  often  the  case  when  conglomerate  or  very 
diversified firms  are in the portfolio.  Another problem occurs 
when  an  improper  convention  is used  to obtain the  SIC  code  for 
the merger.  Therefore,  in this analysis,  rivals were  obtained 
from  a  variety  of  sources  with  the  expectation  of  an  accurate 29 
portfolio  which  would  reveal  anticompetitive  or  efficiency 
effects of merger  (see Hopkins  (1987:Table 4.1)). 
stratification of Riva- l  Portfolios 
All  previous  au-thors  treated  merger  rivals  homogeneously. 
Some  economists  would  argue that the effects of  a  collusive or 
efficient merger  on rivals,  is asymmetric depending  on the size 
or status of  the r.ival  firm  in the market.  A  firm that is one 
of the dominant core may  be affected differently by  a  collusive 
merger_ than would  a  competitive  fringe  firm.  A  smaller fringe 
firm may  accrue greater benefits from  a  collusive scheme  than  a 
dominant  core  firm.  Also  a  highly  diversified,  conglomerate 
firm may  be affected differently than  a  firm producing  a  single 
product  line  in  the  merger-affected  market.  One  obvious 
stratifier would  be market share.  Other classification schemes 
included diversification strategy  (i.e.,  Rumelt  1978)  and  firm 
size. 
One  classification  strategy  was  made  available  through 
information on the percentages of the rival firm's shipments  in 
the  relevant  market.  This  is  not  market  share  data  and  thus 
does  not  reflect  firm  size.  It  reflects  the  degree  of 
specialization of the rival  firm  in the relevant market.  This 
information  was  provided  by  the  DOJ  with  the  rivals  of  the 
Eckbo-Wier  study.  The  DOJ  believed this  information  came  from 
the Department of the Census  in the form of a  tape which had the 
top  20  firms  and  their  shipment  data  within  a  four-digit  SIC 
code.  Because this information was not available for all firms, 
it  was  decided  that  the  wealth  gain  for  each  firm  would  be 30 
calculated  for  the  31-day  window  surrounding  each  event  and  a 
contingency table would be generated utilizing percent shipments 
for  these  firms.  The  wealth  gain  for  a  firm  is  the  abnormal 
return,  or residual,  multiplied  by  the price  and  the  number  of 
outstanding  shares.  This  daily wealth  gain  is  then  cumulated 
over the  31-day window. 
A  contingency  table  depicts  the  measure  of  association 
between two variables or to what extent the level of wealth gain 
occurs with the level of percent shipments  in the relevant mar-
ket.  The  X2  test of statisticai significance is an appropriate 
measure.  The  firms were divided into three roughly equal-sized 
categories  based  on  shipments  in  the  relevant  market:  8-20%, 
21-50%,  and  50-100%.  The following table,  Table 2,  contains the 
names  of rivals  in the strata. 
Empirical Results 
Results  of Rival Portfolios of  Challenged Horizontal Mergers 
Of the 44  events involving 22  challenged horizontal mergers, 
22  events exhibited significant abnormal returns in at least one 
of the ,five  windows  surrounding the event date at the  95%  level 
of  statistical significance.  The  pattern  of  returns  for  each 
hypothesis and the mergers conforming to the patterns are listed 
in Table  3. 
Put another way,  looking at each event separately,  there is 
a  preponderance  (50%)  of  insignificant  (from' zero)  results.  Of 
the  22  announcement  events,  10  were  insignificant,  7  were Table  2.  Rival  Firms stratified by  Percent Shipments  in the Relevant Industry 
stratal  Rivals 
8-20%  Panasote,  Inc.  Kaiser  Aluminum  and  Chemical  Corporation 
Reynolds  Metals,  Inc.  Ingersoll  Rand  Company 
General  Electric Company  Studebaker Worthington,  Inc. 
Allis Chalmers  Westinghouse Electric corporation 
Chevron  Corporation  Mobil oil 
United states Tobacco  Company  Square  D  Technology 
21-50%  Reichhold  Chemicals  Chicago  Pneumatic Tool 
Joy Manufacturing  General  Electric Company 
Amoco  Corporation  Exxon  Corporation 
Gulf  Corporation  Phillips Petroleum  Company 
Emerson  Electric Company  Ashland oil Company 
Shell oil Company  Amoco 
American  Brands,  Inc. 
51-100%  Baker  International Corporation  Marathon oil Company 
Sunbeam  Corporation  Rohm  & Haas  Company 
Hughes  Tool  Company  Sohio 
Gearhart  Industries,  Inc.  smith  International,  Inc. 
Sun,  Inc.  Universal  Cigar Corporation 
Electronics Corporation Amer. 
Percent  of  company  total sales  in the  four-digit  SIC  industry  in which  the horizontal 
merger  occurred  . 
. Source:  Author  1986  (Department  of Justice). 32 
positive and  5  were  negative.  Of  the  22  merger  challenges,  12 
were  insignificant,  7  were positive and  3  were negative.  It is 
important to note that the results for the one day window,  which 
was  used  by  stillman,  was  significant  for  only  two  of  his  44 
merger  events.8 
Analysis utilizing Received  Hypotheses 
Examining the sign of the abnormal returns the mergers were 
categorized by economic hypotheses.  Of the 16 mergers which had 
at least one  significant event,  11  did not fit any of the hypo-
theses  posited  by  the  efficient  markets  position.  Of  these 
eleven,  four had no abnormal returns,  either at the announcement 
or challenge date.  This  can  be  seen as fitting the  information 
efficiency hypothesis  or being  inconclusive. 
The united Technologies and  Babcock  & wilcox merger fit the 
collusion hypothesis of positive abnormal returns at the time of 
the  announcement  and  negative  abnormal  returns  at  the  time  of 
the challenge.  This is also consistent with the hypothesis that 
there  are  combined  effects  of  collusion/efficiency.  The 
American  Maize  and  Bayuk  Cigar  merger fit the  productive effi-
ciency hypothesis  of  negative  abnormal  returns at  announcement 
and positive abnormal  returns at challenge,  but this pattern is 
consistent with  a  predatory scenario. 
8  These two events were the announcement and challenge dates for 
the Alcan Aluminum  and Revere  Copper  and  Brass.  The  announce-
ment  exhibited positive significance  over  all  5  windows.  The 
challenge exhibited positive significance over  3  windows. Table  3.  Mergers  Grouped  by  Patterns of Signs  on  Returns to Rivals Mergers. 
Rival  Return 
Mergers 
Announcement  Challenge 
Hypothesis  Supported 
united Technologies/  +  - Mar~et Power  (Collusion) 
Babcock  & wilcox 
American  Maize/Bayuk Cigars  - +  Productive Efficiency 
DuPont/Conoco  +  0  Information Efficiency/ 
Market  Power1 
LTV/Republic  Steel· 
Texaco/Getty  • 
Wheelabrator-Frye/Pullman 
Allied Chemical/General  Foam  0  0  Information Efficiency/ 
Inconclusive  •  ConAgra/Peavey  . 
Eversharp/Schick 
Exxon/Reliance  Electric 
Cooper/Westinghouse  • 




Warner  Lambert/Parke-Davis 
--- ----- --Rival  Return 
Mergers 
Announcement  Challenge 
Hypothesis  Supported 
Chemetron/Harnischfeger  0  +  None/ 
Efficiency 
Cooper/Gardner-Denver 
.  .  . 
Allled/Slgnal 
White  Consolidated/White Motor 
Great  Lakes  Chemical,  0  - None/ 
Northwest  Industries  Market  Power 
Alcan  Aluminum/  +  +  None 
Revere  Copper  & Brass 
Tenneco/Monroe  Auto  Equipment 
Gifford-Hill/Interpace  •  None  - -
Upper hypothesis suggested by  Eckbo  and  lower hypothesis the author's interpretation of 
theory.  See Table  1  above. 
* Post-1981  merger. 35 
The  pattern  of  abnormal  returns  which  characterize  the 
hypothesis  of  efficiency/information  is  positive  or  zero 
abnormal returns at the time of announcement and zero returns at 
the time of the challenge.  This is indicative of the merger  as 
a  signal of  undervalued resources  in the target firm  which  may 
or  may  not  extend  to  the  merger  rivals.  Four  mergers  fell  in 
this category.  One  of these,  the Texaco  and  Getty  merger  is  a 
special  case  because  the  assumptions  of  the  model  require that 
no  other  merger  is  occurring  in  the  industry  and  in  the  same 
year the Chevron  and  Gulf  merger  was  attempted  and  challenged. 
There were five mergers which had  no significant returns or 
a  zero sign at both the announcement  and at the challenge.  This 
pattern  can  be  interpreted as  an  information-efficiency effect 
or as  inconclusive. 
Two  mergers  had  abnormal  positive  returns  at  both  the 
announcement  and  the  challenge  and  one  merger  had  negative 
returns for  both events,  patterns that fit no  hypothesis.  Five 
mergers  had  no  abnormal  returns on  announcement  and significant 
returns at the time  of  the  challenge.  Four  of  the mergers  had 
posi ti  ve  significant  returns  at  the  challenge.  Again,  no 
hypothesis  is verified in these cases. 
By  the revisionist  framework  these returns  can  seem  incon-
clusive.  If  the  pattern  of  returns  are  given  new  interpre-
tat  ions  or  the  assumption  of  no  collusion  is  relaxed,  it is 
possible to have  alternative hypotheses. 36 
Interpretation of  Inconclusive Patterns of Rival Returns 
One  of the patterns of returns,  one  of positive returns  on 
announcement  and  zero  returns  on  the  challenge  corresponds  to 
the  information  efficiency  hypothesis  but  could  be  construed, 
ad hoc,  as  collusive  because  there  is  historical  evidence  of 
collusion  in  these  industries  or  structural  conditions  would 
permi tit.  The  DuPont  and  Conoco  merger  with  its  relevant 
market of acrylic fibers;  LTV  and Republic Steel merger with the 
hot  and  cold rolled,  sheet  and  stainless steel;  and  Texaco  and 
Getty merger with the relevant market of refined light products 
and  the transport  of  those  products  are all in  industries with 
high  sunk  costs  and  thus  considerable  barriers  to  en.try.  The 
Wheelabrator-Frye  and  Pullman  merger's  relevant  market  is 
electric arc  furnaces  and  tall  industrial  chimneys.  Research 
revealed  that  this  is  a  competi ti  ve  bid  industry,  in  which 
profits for all firms  would  tend to increase when  the number  of 
bidders is reduced. 
However,  a  number  of the mergers  remain that do  not corre-
spond to any of the accepted theories.  Eleven of the mergers  in 
this sample had  inconclusive patterns of returns for rivals for 
the  events  examined.  In  an  effort to understand  these results 
the following post hoc hypotheses are presented.  The pattern of 
negative  returns  on  announcement  and  zero  returns  on  challenge 
was  exhibited  by  three  mergers  Atlantic  Richfield  and 
Sinclair,  Allied  and  King  Radio,  and  Warner  Lambert  and  Park-
Davis.  Of  these,  two  of  the bidder  firms  had  negative returns 
on  announcement -- Atlantic Richfield and  Warner  Lambert.  This 37 
may  be  seen  as  evidence  of  market  inefficiency.  The  stock 
prices  are  adjusting  to  new  information "or  beliefs  about  the 
state of health of the industry.  An  additional explanation may 
be  that  insignificant  returns  at the  time  of  the  announcement 
may  reflect an  expectation at that time  in the  capital markets 
that the merger will be  challenged. 
Alternative Hypotheses 
If  the  assumption  that  the "  merging  firms  operate  in  a 
competitive industry is dropped,  then the market  power  hypothe-
sis  may  allow  the  merged  firm  to  act  as  a  monopolist  in  the 
long-run  if the  industry has  a  high  degree  of differentiation. 
Of the three mergers  in the negative/zero pattern,  two relate to 
highly differentiated products.  Warner  Lambert  and  Park-Davis 
deal  with  over-the-counter  and  prescription  drugs,  and  Allied 
and  Klng  Radio  deal  in  weather  radar  for  commercial  aircraft. 
The  Atlantic  Richfield  and  Sinclair  merger  was  in  the  branded 
retail  gasoline  market,  which  may  be  seen  as  differentiated. 
This  negative/zero pattern" could  also  occur  under  a  productive 
efficiency hypothesis where the challenge was anticipated.  This 
is believed to  be  the more  likely of the  two  scenarios. 
If  the  merger  is  productively  efficient  but  occurs  in  a 
collusive  environment,  then  the  pattern  of  abnormal  returns 
could be  zero at the" time of  announcement.  Rivals may  not per-
ceive the threat of  the  efficient merger.  Then,  returns  could 
be positive at the  time  of  the challenge  because the  danger  of 
the productive efficient merger could be realized by the rivals 
and  is  relieved  by  the  challenge.  This  could  also  be  the 38 
pattern where  the  window  was  unable  to detect  abnormal  returns 
due  to  advance  information  leakage.  If the merger  occurs  in  a 
homogeneous product market then there is a  possible benefit from 
the announcement  because there is a  reduced chance  of predatory 
behavior.  The  assumption  is homogeneous  product markets  might 
incur  greater  losses  from  predatory  behavior  because  there  is 
little differentiation or product loyalty for these firms.  The 
challenge would  not have  a  perceived effect on  the rivals. 
An  Evaluation of  Event  studies 
Information Assumption  Problems 
Some problems are shared by this study and previous studies. 
One problem involves the validity of the information assumption. 
The model  assumes that the information about the merger  and  its 
effects are efficiently and  completely distributed to the  mar-
ket.  When  utilizing event  studies to make  policy  implications 
about the efficacy of antitrust enforcement,  it is important to 
note that antitrust enforcement agencies may  have  some  informa-
tion about the competitive .and efficiency effects not available 
to investors  in the capital market  . .  This  is especially true in 
the case  of the mergers'  effects on  rivals. 
An  additional consideration of the information hypothesis is 
that the  information about the merger  must  be  ne~ and unantici-
pated.  Werden  and  Williams  (1986)  suggest  that  merger  events 
are oftentimes anticipated.  This is based  on their observation 
that the parties who  are interested in the merger  spend consid-
erable resources to find out about the course of the investigation. 39 
The  fact that much  information is anticipated has  implica-
tions  for  the  preponderance  of  inconclusive  results.  The 
effects  on  the price of  a  firms'  stock  in response  to  a  merger 
may  not  reflect  the  merger's  effect  on  profits.  Some  of  the 
revenues  garnered  by  collusion are diverted to  rent-seeking --
the costs of  holding together the collusive  scheme.  One  reply 
that has  been made  on the theoretical level is that the effects 
of the efficient merger may  be ambiguous  on stock prices because 
the  efficiency  may  not  have  an  impact  on  market  price  since 
savings in fixed or variable costs may  be  inframarginal  and  not 
be  reflected  in  the  stock's  price  (Werden  and  Williams  1986). 
Inconclusive  results  may . occur  because  the  majority  of 
challenged  horizontal  mergers  are  not  mergers  tending  toward 
monopoly,  but  are  mergers  which  result  in  "only  moderate 
increases  in market  concentration"  (Werden  and  Williams  1986). 
Horizontal  merger  policy  may  have  a  component  of  self-
enforcement because merger attempts are not cost  less and mergers 
that are undoubtably anticompetitive are never  put forth. 
Rival  Selection Problems 
The problems involved in rival selection have been discussed 
with respect to the  Eckbo~Wier study  in Chapter  Four.  Many  of 
the  relevant  rivals  are  too  small  to  be  actively  traded  on 
either of the exchanges or are privately-owned.  Large publicly 
traded rivals may  be  highly diversified and  the response of the 
firm's  stock  may  be  to  an  event  other  than  the  merger  in 
question.  The  po~sibility of  other  events  which  occur  in  the 
estimation period  may  also  further  obscure  the  firms'  reaction 40 
to  the  merger.  An  additional  problem  is  the  possibility  of 
asymmetric effects on the rivals to the merger events.  It is to 
this end that the stratification of rivals was  attempted. 
stratification and  Results 
The  stratification  of  rival  firms  is  desirable  because  a 
merger having  a  motivation of market  power  (collusion)  may  have 
differential effects on the rivals depending  on  the firm's size 
or degree  of participation in the market.  Therefore,  a  X2 test 
of  statistical  significance  was  performed  to  measure  the 
observed  joint  distribution  of  the  cases  that  would  have 
occurred  when  no  association  of  the  variables  occur  in  the 
population.  The  percentage of rival firm shipments  in relevant 
SIC  code  data  was  available  for  34  of  the  rival  firms  in this 
study.  For  all  rivals,  the  firm's  wealth  gain  (WG)  ·for  the 
31-day  period  surrounding the  event  date  was  computed  with the 
following  equation: 
(10)  WG  =  (~t) (Pit) (Sit)' 
where: 
~t  =  residual  or daily abnormal  return, 
daily share price for  firm i,  and 
number  of  outstanding shares  for  firm i. 
The wealth gains for the  31  days  surrounding the event were 
stratified in three  roughly  equal  groups  in  order to construct 
a  contingency table.  The  contingency table provided  a  measure 
of  association  between  the variables,  percent  shipments  in the 41 
ma'rket and  the wealth gain  around  the event,  as  indicated  by  a 
X2 distribution. 
,A  further , variable  was  added  to  determine  whether  the 
statistical  analysis  the  merger,  based  on  the  returns  to  the 
rival  portfolio  was  'significant.  The  hypotheses  were  put  in 
three  broad  groups,  in '  Qrder  of  decreasing  evidence  of 
collusion;  market  power,  inconclusive,  and  efficient. 
The goal of the stratification of the,merger rivals and the 
contingency  table  analysis  of  the  wealth  gain  surrounding  the 
event  and  the  percent  shipments  in  the  relevant  market  was  to 
determine if there is a  connection between the level of  partici~ 
pat  ion  in  the  market  and  the  wealth  gain  for  the  firm  at  the 
time  surrounding the  event.  When  the  percent  shipments  in the 
relevant  industry  were  compared  with  the  wealth  gain  in  the 
period  surrounding  the  merger  announcement,  the  contingency 
table had a  confidence level of 91. 6%  based on a  X2  distribution. 
There  was  a  tendency  for  firms  with  a  small  commitment  to  the 
market  to  have  small  wealth  gains.  Firms  with  medium-level 
commi'tment  had  a ' lesser  tendency  to  have  smaller  wealth  gains 
and  a  greater  tendency  to  be  associated  with  larger  wealth 
gains.  Firms  highly specialized  had  a  low  tendency  to exhibit 
high  wealth  gains.  Thus  seven  of  the  twelve  medium  percent 
shipments firms had high wealth gains at announcement while only 
two of the twelve had  low wealth gains,  and  one of the ten high 
shipments  had  hlgh  wealth gains.  This  indicates that there is 
'not  a  linear  relationship  between  percent  shipments  in  the 
relevant industry and wealth gain at announcement.  Wealth gains 42 
on  announcement  which  is the  abnormal  return multiplied  by  the 
price  and  number  of  shares  outstanding,  tend  to  be  larger  for 
larger  firms  which  may  be  due  to  the  number  of  shares 
outstanding which  is greater for  larger firms. 
When  the same  comparison was  made with wealth gains for the 
firm  over  the merger  challenge period,  the  X2  was  in the  97.4% 
confidence  level.  'The  same  tendency  was  found  in the analysis 
of  wealth  gain  at the  challenge  with  the  percent  shipments  as 
was  found  in the analysis of wealth gain at announcement.  Firms 
with  small  percent  shipments  exhibited  a  greater propensity to 
wealth gains.  Firms  with mid-level  percent  shipments  had  less 
than-expected mid-level wealth gains and  mor~ high wealth gains. 
,The  f fr!lls  with  high  percent  shipments  had  more  mid  and  high 
level wealth gains. 
When  comparing  the  firm's  wealth  gain  at  the  time  of  the 
announcement  and the category the merger fell into based  on  the 
results  of  the  pattern  and  sign  of  rival  returns,  the  X2  was 
found  to be significant at a  98.5%  confidence level.  The  firms 
which  fit  the  collusive  hypothesis  had  a  less  than  expected 
level of  small wealth gains and greater than expected levels of 
higher  wealth  gains.  The  efficiency  hypothesis  firms  had  no 
significant differences in all predicted categories.  The  incon-
clusive merger  firms  had  greater small  wealth  gains  and  higher 
levels of mid-level wealth gains.  This  can  be  -summed  up  by the 
finding that the level of wealth gain increases as the evidence 
of  collusion  increases.  This  is  true  for  wealth  gain  at  both 
event dates. 43 
The  comparison  of  the  wealth  gain  at  the  time  of  the 
challenge  and  the  merger  hypothesis  had  a  0.2%  significance 
level.  Firms  fitting the collusive hypothesis  had  no  observa-
tions  in  the  smallest  wealth  gain  category  and  a  higher  than 
expected  level  of  high  wealth  gains.  There  was  a  greater 
tendency  for  the efficiency hypothesis  firms  to have" mid-level 
and  high  level of  wealth gains.  The  inconclusive  firms  had  no 
observations  in the high wealth gain group. 
Conclusions 
On  the basis of the  44  merger  events  (22  mergers)  examined 
in this study,  a  variety of rival market return p~tterns emerge. 
In many  challenged horizontal merger cases,  the strategy behind 
the merger is obscure.  The reactions of the rival's returns may 
be  in response to many  events unrelated to the merger  event. 
In  any  case,  the  event-study  methodology  is  not  without 
flaws.  It  may  be  that  changes  in  the  systematic  risk  were 
significant  and  uncorrected.  These  changes  may  be  related  to 
the  tendency  of  mergers  to  coincide  with  increases  in  the 
indicators  of  economic  expansion  and  may  reflect  a  financial 
environment conducive to merger.  Moreover,  no  attempt was  made 
to discern  between  scale  economies  and  other rationales  in the 
efficiency argument. 
Using the received hypotheses,  there were trends iD the data 
that suggested market  power  in "only  1  of  the  22  mergers  in the 
sample.  This  was  the  pattern  of  positive  abnormal  returns  at 
the announcement and  n~gative abnormal returns at the challenge. 44 
The efficiency hypothesis appeared to be acceptable in 5  of the 
22  mergers,  with  patterns.  of  returns  at  announcement  and 
challenge of negative/positive and zero/positive.  The remaining 
16 mergers had inconclusive patterns of signs using the received 
hypotheses. 
Using  our  alternative hypotheses,  the  data  suggest  market 
power  in six of the 22  mergers  in the sample.  These mergers had 
the  pattern  of  signs  at the  announcement  and  the  challenge  of 
positive/negative,  zero/positive  and  zero/negative.  The 
efficiency  hypothesis  was  evidenced  in  eight  of  these  mergers 
with the pattern of signs:  negative/positive,  negative/zero and 
zero/positive.  The  remaining  seven  mergers  had  inconclusive 
patterns of  signs of rival returns. 
Examining the eight mergers that were  challenged after the 
implementation of the  1982  Merger Guidelines,  it was  found  that 
two  of  the  eight  corresponded  to  the  information  efficiency 
hypothesis  posited  by  Eckbo-Wier  (1985),  and  the  market  power 
hypothesis  with  the  market's  expectation  of  the  challenge 
posited  by  the  author.  Two  mergers  had  zero,  or  no  abnormal 
returns  for  rivals  at  both  events  dates.  The  remaining  four 
mergers  had  various patterns  of  rival returns that were  incon-
clusive using the received hypotheses. 
The main merger rationales examined in this study are market 
power  and  economic  efficiency.  other  rationales  exist  that 
cannot  be  analyzed with event studies. 45 
The  Market  Model 
The model used in this study was the Market Model,  a  variant 
of  the  Capital  Asset  Pricing  Model  both  of  which  employ  five 
major  assumptions.  The  assumption  of  efficiency  in  capital 
markets has been questioned by many  authors and  some  results of 
·this study can support these questions. 
The  assumption  of  market  reaction  to  all  information  has 
cri  tics  inside  and  outside  of  event-study  methodology.  The 
assumption  of  the  stationarity  of  systematic-risk  or  beta 
stationarity in event-study methodology  was  examined  by  Kupiec 
and  Mathios.  These  authors  found,  using  data · from  Stillman 
(1983),  that  the  systematic  risk  of  the  rival  firms  decrease 
after  the  events  whic~ increase  the  probability  of  the  merger 
(announcement)  and  increase after the events which decrease the 
probability  of  merger  (challenge).  Thus,  the  stationarity 
assumption is probably  incorrect for  merger  analysis. 
The assumption of no other mergers occurring in the industry 
is a  real problem.  One  of the mergers in the original sample of 
this  study  Texaco  and  Getty  was  undertaken  at  a  time  when 
another challenged and highly visible merger between Chevron and 
Gulf  was  being played  out  in  board  rooms  and  the  media.  There 
were · also  prior  bids  for  the  target,  which  may  affect  the 
returns.  This  was  also  true  in  three  cases  in  the  samples  of 
prior researchers.  Information leaks about other mergers in the 
industry,  even if "unannounced",  seriously hamper event studies. 46 
Sample  Selection 
Authors of similar event studies differ in the selection of 
the portfolio of rivals.  No  standard or even replicable selec-
tion criterion has  been developed.  Thus,  the critical decision 
of  the  identify  of  rivals  in the  market  is highly  judgmental. 
Non-listed  rivals  must  be  omitted,  both  domestic  and  inter-
national.  All  rivals  are  treated  as  homogeneous,  whereas,  in 
fact,  they differ in size and relation to the market. 
An  analysis  of  the  stratification  of  the  rivals  in  our 
sample  on  the  basis  of  specialization  in  the  market  compared 
with wealth gain  for  the  firm  in the  31-day  period  surrounding 
the  announcement  or  challenge  date,  showed  that  the  two 
variables were not independent.  Thus,  event analyses of mergers 
that ·treat all rivals  the  same  are  faulted.  Rivals  differ  by 
degree  of specialization and  probably other features  as well. 
Policy Analysis 
When  using the received hypotheses to analyze this sample, 
certain mergers in the sample may  be seen as exhibiting evidence 
of collusion  (4.5%),  some mergers exhibit evidence of efficiency 
(22 . 7%),  and the remaining mergers  appear  inconclusive  (72.7%). 
When  using the author's hypotheses,  market power may  be detected 
in 27.3%  of the mergers,  efficiency in 36.4%,  and the remaining 
mergers  (36.4%)  are  inconclusive.  These  results  have  implica-
tions for policy towards  challenged horizontal mergers.  Previ-
ous  researchers  have  accepted that the market  for  corporations 
is  inherently  efficient,  denounced  restrictions  on  mergers  as 
inefficient,  and  called  for  changes  in  merger  policy.  These 47 
policy  suggestions  are  at  best  premature.  The  event-study 
methodology  is  fraught  with  problems.  These  problems  include 
unrealistically  strict assumptions  of  the  model,  questionable 
results  of  event  studies,  and  rival-portfolio selection diffi-
cuI  ties.  Major  improvements in the event-study method is needed 
before any  changes  in merger policy can  be  contemplated. 
Limitations  of the study 
The sample of challenged mergers used in this study consists 
of  legally borderline  cases.  U.S.  managers  are  well  aware  of 
merger  law;  most would  probably not  atte~pt mergers which would 
be  considered grossly  anticompetitive.  The  result is that the 
mergers  challenged  since  1960  are  not  likely  to  present 
overwhelming  evidence  of market  power. 
By  limiting the rival portfolio to  CRSP  tape  firms  on  the 
American  or  New  York  stock  Exchanges,  the  results  of  event 
studies are  automatically biased toward  large  firms.  It would 
be  better  to  look  at  the  stock  price  effects  on  the  smaller 
firms  in the  over-the-counter market  because  the collusion  and 
efficiency  hypotheses  should  have  clearer . effects  on  smaller 
firms.  A  further problem exists with regard to stratifying the 
rival  firms.  Market  .share  data  would  be  optimal  yet  it  is 
difficult  to  obtain.  A  second  option  would  be  to  categorize 
firms  by  size.  Using  employment  data  for  firms  on  a  sector  or 
plant basis is a  future stratification scheme when the data base 
with that  information  is made  available. 
The  announcement  date  used  for  the  merger  may  not  be  the 
best  period  to  examine  abnormal  returns.  It  is  thought  that 48 
perhaps  the  firm's  strategic  choice  to  merge  may  have  greater 
impact  on  the  market  than  the  choice  of  a  particular  target 
firm.  Another consideration is the common practice of the anti-
trust  enforcement  agency  issuing  a  consent  decree  at  the  same 
time  as the  challenge.  This  practice limits the  applicability 
of  event studies because it converts  an  event to  a  non-event. BIBLIOGRAPHY 50 
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Appendix  Table.Mergers,  Relevant Markets,  and  Rival  Portfolios. 
Rival  Firms 
Merged  Firms 
Principal  (market) 
Sourcesl  Name  SIC 
Allied Chemical  Panasote,  Inc.  2821  E1 
General  Foam  Reichhold  Chemicals,  Inc.  2821  E1 
(urethane  foam)  Rohm  & Haas  2821  E1 
Alcan  Aluminum  Aluminum  Co.  America  3353  E1,  E2 
Revere  Copper  Kaiser  Aluminum  3334  E1,  E2 
(aluminum)  Reynolds  Aluminum  3353  El,  E2 
Cooper  Baker  International  3533  E1 
Gardner-Denver  Binks  Mfg.  3561  E1 
(gas  compressors,  Chicago  Pneumatic  Tool  3563  E2 
air tools)  Copeland Corporation  3563  E2 
Gearhart  3533  E1 
Hughes  Tool  3533  E1 
Ingersoll  Rand  3563  E1,  E2 
Joy  Mfg.  3532  E1,  E2 
McDermott  3533  E1 
Milton  Roy  3561  E1 
Smith  International  3533  E1 
Studebaker Worthington  3563  E2 
United Technologies  Allis Chalmers  3511  E1 
Babcock  & 'Wilcox  Combustion  Engineering  3511  E1 
(utility power  Cooper  Industries  3511  E1 
equipment)  Foster Wheeler  3511  E1 
General  E,lectric  3511  E1 
Riley  Company  3511  E1 
Westinghouse  3511  E1 
Gifford-Hill  Ameron  3272  H13 
Interpace  Jim  Walter  2661  H13 
(large diameter 
pressure pipe) 
Atlantic Richfield  Amoco  2911  E2 
Sinclair  Ashland Oil  2911  E1 
(branded retail  Chevron  2911  E1 
gasoline)  Conoco  2911  E2 
Exxon  2911  E2 
Gulf  2911  E1 
Husky  2911  E1 
Marathon  2911  E1 
Mobil  2911  E1 
Phillips  2911  E1 
Shell Oil  2911  E2 
Sohio  2911  E1 
Sun  2911  E1 
Chemetron  Airco  2813  H7 
Harnischfeger  Hobart  3551  H7 
(welding  apparatus)  Newcor,  Inc.  3623  E1 
Union  Carbide  2819  H7 
Eversharp  General Electric  3634  E1 
Schick  Gillette  3421  H2 
(shaving  equipment)  Sunbeam  Corporation  3634  E1 Exxon 
Merged  Firms 
(market) 
Reliance Electric 
(motor  speed 
regulators) 
Tenneco 
Monroe  Auto  Equipment 
(replacement  shocks) 
DuPont 
Conoco 






(tall chimneys,  arc 
furnaces) 
White  Consolidated 
White  Motor 
(farm machinery) 
American Maize 
Bayuk  Cigars 
(cigars) 
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Square  D  Company 






American  Cyanamid 
Imperial  Chemical 
Sohio 
Abbott  Labs 
American  Cyanamid 
American  Home  Products 
Baxter  Travenol 
Carter Wallace 
Chesebrough  Ponds 
Cutter Labs 
Dart  Industries 
Forrest Labs 
ICN  Pharmaceuticals 
Inolex 
Marion  Labs 
Miles  Labs 
Morton  Shoe  Companies 
Pfizer 
Richardson Merrill 
Robins  A  H  Inc. 
Rorer  Group 
Schering Plough 
Searle 





Heinicke  Inst. 
Raymond  International,  Inc. 
Allis Chalmers 
Deere  & Co. 
International Harvester 
Massey  Ferguson 
Culbro 
American  Brands 
Loews 
u.S.  Tobacco 



































































































El,  E2 ' Merged  Firms 
(market) 
LTV 
Republic  Steel 
(rolled,  sheet, 
stainless steel) 
Allied 
King  Radio 
(weather  radio  for 
aircraft) 
Allied 
Signal  Companies 








(hard wheat  &  bakery 
flour milling) 
Great  Lakes  Chemicals 
Northwest  Industries 
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Interlake,  Inc. 
u.S.  Steel 
Wheeling  Pittsburgh 
Rockwell 
Sperry 
. Plessy Plc 
S  L  Industries 
Smith  International 
Sundstand Corporation 






Gulf  Oil 
Mobil  Oil 
Phillips 
Sohio 
Carnation  Company 
General  Mills,  Inc. 
International Multifoods 
Nabisco  Brands 
Pillsbury 
Dow  Chemical 
Ethyl Corporation 
E  G  &  G 
General  Electric 
Harvey  Hubbell 
TRW,  Inc. 
2  =  Agency  rival  (FTC  or  DOJ) 
Firms 
Principal 
Sources!  SIC 
3312  H2  ..  3312  H2 
3312  H2 
3312  H2 
3312  H2 
3714  H8 
3574  H8 
3662  H9,  H11 
3579  H9,  H11 
3533  H9,  Hll 
3541  H2 
3873  H9,  H11 
3483  H9,  H11 
3724  H2 
2911  H2 
2911  H10 
2911  H10 
2911  H10 
2911  H2 
2911  H2 
2911  H2 
2031  H3 
2043  H3 
2052  H3 
2052  H3 
2045  H3 · 
2812  H12 
2899  H12 
8911  H6 
3634  H6 
3643  H6 
3714  H6 
5 
6  = 
Mr.  W.  Van  Beek,  Department of Agricultural Economics,  Purdue University 
FAA  publication 
7  = 
8  = 
9  = 
10  = 
11  = 
12  = 
13  = 
14  = 
15  = 
M.  Bruce,  NDR  Oxygen,  Lafayette,  IN 
Dr.  Irwin Treager,  Department of Aviation Technology,  Purdue University 
Dr.  Jack Marchand,  Department of Aviation Technology,  Purdue University 
Oil  & Gas  Journal  Data  Book,  1985 
Aviation Week and Space Technology,  1986 International Directory,  123 (26) 
Mr.  Don  Bouchard,  Great  Lakes  Chemical,  company  representative 
Gifford-Hill,  company  representative 
Dr.  Jim  MacDonald,  USDA-ERS 
Thomas'  Register -- ~ - ---
NE-165 
PRIVATE  STRATEGIES,  PUBLIC  POLICIES 
&  FOOD SYSTEM  PERFORMANCE 
---------- Working Paper Series ----------
Purpose: The  NE-165 Working Paper Series provides access to and facilitates research on food 
and  agricultural  marketing  questions.  It  is  intended  to  be  a  publication  vehicle  for  interim  and 
completed  research  efforts  of  high  quality. A  working  paper  can  take  many  forms.  It  may  be 
a paper that was delivered at a conference or symposium but not published. It may be-a research 
report that ultimately appears in  full  or abbreviated form  as  a journal article or chapter in  a book. 
Using the  working  paper series  enables a researcher to  distribute the  report more quickly and 
in  more  extensive  detail  to  key  research  users.  A working-paper  may  also  be  an  end  product 
in  itself, for  example,  papers that  collate  data,  report  descriptive  results,  explore  new  research 
methodologies, or stimulate thought on  research questions. 
Procedures: Working  papers  may  address any  issues  in  the  food  and  agricultural  marketing 
area as described in  the NE-165: Private Strategies, Public Policy and Food System Performance, 
project statement. This  research agenda is available from  Professor Ronald Cotterill, Chair of NE-
165 at the address given  below. A prospective working paper should be  forwarded to  the  Chair 
who will coordinate a review of the paper by two research peers. Alternatively authors may submit 
two  independent peer  reviews  with  their  paper.  Based  upon  independent  reviewer  comments 
the  Chair  may accept. accept with  revisions, or  reject the  submission.  If  accepted the  Chair  will 
issue  working  paper  covers, and  a  mailing  list  to  the  author  who  shall  have  responsibility  for 
preparing and  distributing copies to  all  persons and  organizations on  the  mailing  list.  Additional 
copies of working papers are available from the author or from the  Food  Marketing Policy Center 
at The  University of Connecticut. 
Professor Ronald W. Cotterill, Food Marketing Policy Center. 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology 
Box U-21 
The  University of Connecticut 
Storrs, Connecticut 06269-4021 
Tel.  No. (203) 486-4394 